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The paper analyses the effects of implementation of qua-
si-market reforms on local public transportation systems in 
Finland and Germany. Along with several other sectors of 
public service, local public transportation (LPT) has been 
subject to market-oriented reforms. In line with worldwide 
New Public Management reforms, quasi-market arrange-
ments are presumed to produce more value for money for 
users and citizens. The aim of this paper is to analytically 
compare the organisational settings of LPT provision and 
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delineate the factors that contribute to institutional conver-
gence and divergence when applying quasi-market models. 
An extensive dataset of six case cities from Finland and 
Germany is used in order to analyse some of the most im-
portant trends and trajectories for different governmental 
levels (e.g., EU regulation), reflecting upon the empirical 
findings from the two countries. Utilizing an institutional 
theory approach, the relevant quasi-market arrangements 
in LPT are covered: public monopoly, private monopoly, 
and competitive tendering. The study discusses different 
factors that contribute to or hinder market-oriented struc-
tures in LPT and explores institutional theory-driven expla-
nations as to why, for instance, Finland embraces market 
structures, whereas Germany shows more resistance to in-
creased competition. Certain issues that seem quite similar 
irrespective of the two countries’ contexts are discussed as 
well.
Key words: local public services, public transportation, mar-
kets, quasi-markets, Finland, Germany
1. Introduction 
Local governments worldwide have increasingly relied on new organisa-
tional models to provide their citizens with services. Public sector reforms 
have played a central role in administrative development (Pollit, 1993; 
Hood, 1995). Competitive structures were introduced in former public 
monopolies (Pollit, Bouckaert, 2000; Boyne, 1998), coinciding with the 
New Public Management, an attempt to make public services more effi-
cient through, for instance, managed markets (Hood, 2000). This concept 
has been applied to almost all services that are or have been organised by 
public administration, such as health care, education, and transportation 
(Bartlett et al., 1994, 1998; Walsh, 1995).
These reforms have influenced the structure of the public sector as a 
whole. Formerly, services were integrated into the structure of public ad-
ministration (Rees, 1976), whereas currently, provision units are separate 
and work independently. Between the provider and the public authority 
(purchaser), there is usually a contract defining the demand for and quali-
ty of a service and the compensation for its provision (Walsh et al., 1997). 
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Another change is the introduction of profit-seeking private companies 
into fields that provide public services (Parker, Saal, 2003). A substantial 
development is the introduction of competitive structures that replace 
traditionally monopolistic ones. These new provision types resemble mar-
ket structures to some extent and are therefore summarized under the 
term “quasi-market” (LeGrand, Bartlett, 1993). Quasi-markets combine 
the public authorities’ ability to compensate for market failure with mech-
anisms that protect against government failure (LeGrand, 1991). 
The EU adopted many quasi-market reforms, applying them to the pub-
lic transportation sector, and as member states of the EU, Finland and 
Germany are obliged to follow its directives. Still, when comparing organ-
isational forms in Finland and Germany, it becomes obvious that the two 
countries have not converged in the LPT sector: Finland is increasingly re-
lying on the competitive tendering approach and Germany is maintaining 
a de facto public monopoly. In the context of LPT in Finland and Germa-
ny, the two main pressures are the need to adhere to EU legislation and 
the philosophy that quasi-market structures will improve the efficiency 
of public service provision. In this paper, we investigate how these two 
pressures have influenced the shaping of LPT institutional arrangements 
in Finland and Germany. More specifically, the aim of the paper is to 
compare the organisational settings of LPT provision analytically and to 
delineate the factors that contribute to institutional convergence and di-
vergence when applying quasi-market models. 
The paper uses an extensive dataset of six case cities from Finland and 
Germany. The dataset includes documentary and interview data regarding 
quasi-market arrangements for LPT provision in the case cities. The case 
data was collected between 2008 and 2012, and included 25 semi-struc-
tured interviews. Following the data analysis, we discuss the most impor-
tant trends and trajectories for different governmental levels (e.g. EU reg-
ulation), reflecting upon our empirical observations. For the theoretical 
background, the institutional theory approach (e.g. Nelson, 2005) prom-
ises explanatory power to understand the institutional change. From this 
perspective, we cover the relevant settings for quasi-market arrangements 
in LPT: public monopoly, private monopoly, and competitive tendering. 
Methodologically, the paper is an exploratory study with an emphasis on 
the iterative use of theoretical concepts and empirical data. We aim to 
enrich the understanding of quasi-market models in LPT through theo-
retical scrutiny and reflective interpretations of empirical observations. 
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2. The Conceptual Framework and Research 
Design
Regarding methodology, first we identify relevant organisational varia-
tions in LPT, and investigate examples from both countries Germany and 
Finland. We have picked cases that represent each category and analyse 
the status quo as well as the case history with the help of publications and 
semi-structured stakeholder interviews. Interviews have been the source 
of complementary data that is not available from any other source. We 
then identify the factors that led to institutional change and compare 
them by using the national context. Finally, we group the factors accord-
ing to the theoretical considerations. 
Quasi-Markets in the Context of LPT. The quasi-market concept (cf. LeG-
rand, 1993) in New Institutional Economics primarily focuses on own-
ership and market organisation (Nelson, 2005). Ownership theoretically 
defines private entrepreneurs as profit maximisers, whereas public enter-
prises are not (Rees, 1976). Market organisation refers to a situation of 
either monopoly or competition; each approach leads to both positive and 
negative consequences and efficiency gains and losses.
A quasi-market is any arrangement or organisational form on the spectrum 
from an unregulated market to integrated hierarchical services organized 
by (in-house) public administration (cf. Williamson, 1999). A quasi-mar-
ket has some qualities of a free market, but differs in many respects. In 
general, the quasi-market exists whenever the city administration buys 
services from outside the administration (cf. LeGrand, Bartlett, 1993; 
Walsh, 1995). Most notably, its purpose is to separate functions with-
in organisational settings. In public administration, one such solution is 
the purchaser-provider split in which the public provider is an independ-
ent unit with its own management. This unit is legally bound to provide 
services according to a contract between the provider and the purchaser 
(instead of the user). In that sense, the city administration continues to 
define the demand for a service and leaves the position of the customer 
unchanged. LPT contracts are usually made for five to ten years for bus 
services and are subject to revision after that timespan (EU Commission, 
2008).
There are four distinct quasi-market prototypes for LPT service provision 
based on the distinguishing criteria of ownership and market organisa-
tion. In institutional practice, mixed forms of organising, or hybrid forms, 
may occur within one city (cf. Swarts, Warner, 2014). Each approach dif-
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fers based on the degree of market functions, from a protected monopoly 
to organisations resembling a free market. Table 1 illustrates the possible 
arrangements.




Monopoly Public monopoly Private monopoly
Competition  Competitive tendering
Source: cf. Seidel, 2009
Note that both public and private ownership forms exist in a competitive 
market, reducing the variety of forms to three: public monopoly, private 
monopoly, and competitive tendering. For this paper, we have created 
two dimensions of analysis: the ownership and the market organisation. 
Therefore, hybrid forms of LPT are discussed only indirectly (Swarts, 
Warner, 2014). For the sake of clarity of our methodological setting, the 
features of hybridity in LPT are addressed as combinations of public mo-
nopoly, private monopoly, and competitive tendering. We are interested 
in the mechanisms of institutional convergence and divergence in LPT 
in the shape of competitive tendering. However, as noted, hybrid forms 
in LPT represent themselves “in between” the conceptual categories we 
utilize (cf. Ebrahim et al., 2014; Hodge, Greve, 2005).
To study LPT from the institutional perspective, we need to search for 
factors that change the institutional setting. It seems feasible to examine 
cases that began in a different category than they are in now and cases 
that have resisted change (see below for a more detailed explanation of 
the theory). The traditional organisational model of LPT in Finland and 
Germany is different from the competitive tendering model preferred by 
the EU. Although there has been a general tendency to use market-like 
elements in LPT throughout Europe over the last two decades, German 
LPT systems in the past were almost exclusively public monopolies (Beck, 
2012), whereas in Finland private monopolies operated nearly all mid-
sized city services (Rosenberg, 2005). Selecting these countries for analy-
sis enables us to understand to what extent the application of competitive 
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structures depends on “where you come from”, in terms of institutional 
theory (Scott, 1991).
For a detailed investigation, we select cases from both countries that fit 
in each category (three cases in each country, six overall). We trace their 
development, asking how and why they transformed into their current 
institutional forms. To ensure that all varieties are covered and to provide 
an overview, we describe one example of each organisational form at the 
time of observation. 
The case cities were selected based on the following criteria:
–  the level to which the city represents both the form it belongs to 
and how it compares to other cities using the same form;
–  the maturity of the organisational form (there is already institu-
tional history; at least a few years of experience);
–  the city size should be similar for both countries; 
–  the willingness of key actors to participate in the study.
According to these criteria, Frankfurt was selected as a competitive ten-
dering system, Pforzheim (PFO) as a private monopoly and Wuppertal 
as an example of public monopoly for Germany. For Finland, Helsin-
ki (HEL) represents competitive tendering, Jyväskylä (JYV) the private 
monopoly and Tampere the public monopoly. Frankfurt (FRA, popula-
tion 687,775)1 and Helsinki (612,664) are the same size, also in terms 
of their metropolitan areas with having over one million inhabitants 
each and are the most prominent representatives of the frontrunners 
of competitive tendering. Pforzheim (116,425) and Jyväskylä (134,658) 
are similar, in that Pforzheim is the largest of the very few cities in Ger-
many that awarded the service to a private monopolist, and Jyväskylä is 
typical of any mid-sized town in Finland regarding private monopolies 
in LPT up until 2014. Wuppertal (342,885) is slightly larger than Tam-
pere (220,446). Tampere is the last Finnish city to protect their public 
operator from competition and Wuppertal is typical of the vast major-
ity of German cities that prefer to organise services through their own 
company. The fact that Wuppertal also owns a special monorail plays a 
negligible role. See Table 2 for a description of how the city cases fit into 
the quasi-market scheme.
1   Figures for Finland (31. 12. 2013): http://www.stat.fi/tup/suoluk/suoluk_vaesto_
en.html and for Germany: (31. 12. 2012) http://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/1353/
umfrage/einwohnerzahlen-der-grossstaedte-deutschlands/ 
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Monopoly Wuppertal, Tampere Pforzheim, Jyväskylä
Competition Frankfurt, Helsinki
Institutional Convergence and Divergence in LPT Systems – Theoretical Re-
marks. Institutional systems rarely end up with completely similar out-
comes, even if they are subject to common external pressures, or they ap-
ply similar mechanisms or managerial artefacts (Powell, DiMaggio, 1983; 
Vakkuri, 2010). Therefore, it can be assumed that given the distinct local 
conditions, quasi-market arrangements would have diverse implications 
for organising LPT systems in the case cities in Germany and Finland. 
Theoretically, the balance between convergence and divergence is not an 
easy puzzle. Institutional theory has explained the mechanisms of conver-
gence, for instance, by using the argument of isomorphism (Powell, DiM-
aggio, 1991). In both countries, LPT systems have encountered coercive, 
mimetic and normative pressures to adopt and implement quasi-market 
models due to the EU’s common regulatory framework (normative) and 
due to official assumptions about the efficiency of quasi-market systems 
(coercive). It may also have been important for local governments to de-
crease uncertainty in organising LPT by adopting models from perceived 
best practices (mimetic): LPT systems become more similar because in-
stitutional actors imitate each other’s institutional practices (Kuhlmann, 
Wollmann, 2014).
Imitating best practices and applying common regulations might result 
in similar practices among public administration systems, to a certain 
degree, which implies that dissimilarity remains. The important point 
is then to distinguish the similar parts from dissimilar ones, and to dis-
cuss how we can better understand the balance between institutional 
convergence and divergence in LPT. There are two important areas of 
theoretical discussion. First, applying quasi-markets in LPT systems 
may increase convergence, but primarily at the symbolic level. With-
out significant contributions to efficiency, case cities may develop and 
“re-engineer” their LPT systems to resemble the activities of model 
organisations in a ritualistic fashion rather than to achieve true con-
vergence. LPT systems might appear to be similar, but given the local 
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needs and conditions, they actually remain different in many respects 
(March, Olsen, 1988). Second, using quasi-market models is far from 
an unambiguous process because a quasi-market model is not fixed, like 
any politico-administrative artefact; local governments use quasi-market 
models for their contextual and situated practices (Orlikowski, 2000). 
Quasi-market models may help to understand the problems of organis-
ing LPT by (March, Olsen, 1988):
a)  Describing the context of LPT (What is going on? What is the 
most important problem to solve?);
b)  Searching for solutions that contribute to good performance in 
LPT (What should be done to improve LPT?);
Predicting future outcomes (How should the outcomes of applying qua-
si-market models be evaluated?).
In this process, quasi-market models are not pure “textbook models”, as 
they do not remain the same. On the contrary, they are constantly rein-
terpreted, revised, and transformed by institutional actors and the process 
of use, which enriches the comparison of LPT systems in the two coun-
tries in terms of understanding relevant actors’ policy interpretations. By 
exploring those interpretations, we may more fully understand the effects 
of using quasi-market models on LPT (Aidemark, 2001; Vakkuri, 2010, 
2013). Although the case cities can and do (to varying extents) use qua-
si-market models as they were initially designed, they also circumvent pre-
scribed ways of using the models. They tend to ignore certain properties 
that do not fit well into local political and financial conditions. Further-
more, actors tend to work around some properties and invent completely 
new ones. As Lindblom and Cohen (1979) succinctly argued, by doing 
this, institutions may solve some existing problems but simultaneously 
initiate new ones. This applies to the uses of quasi-market models in LPT 
systems.
The Regulatory Framework for LPT in the European Context. In LPT, the 
quasi-market is legally regulated at three levels: EU legislation, national 
laws regarding subsidies, and regional (and/or local) regulations. In this 
section, the relevant EU legislation is presented and the national and re-
gional influences are discussed at the country level.
The regulatory background of LPT in the EU was due for a change in 
2009. The changes affected national legislation, which required additional 
time to change; transitional regulations still apply until 2019. Many of the 
changes are connected to the choices that city administration can make. 
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With adoption of the new EEC 1370/2007, the regulations became more 
specific and detailed compared to the old EEC 1893/91.
Subsidy rules are an important means for the EU regulation to influence 
LPT. Since almost none of the local public bus service can sustain itself 
exclusively by income from fares, the regulations regarding public service 
subsidies apply, and they need to be fair and visible. Consequently, con-
tracts are drawn up and there are specific LPT rules which have undergone 
changes after an extensive debate: EEC 1893/91 mandates authorities to 
use competitive tendering for unprofitable services (compulsory competi-
tive tendering as in the UK), unless national laws specify otherwise. Local 
authorities in some countries, including Germany, argued against includ-
ing certain kinds of subsidies into the calculation of profitability, such as 
special fares for students and elderly. Moreover, the authorities believed 
that the EU’s restrictions would impede the subsidy principle by limiting 
local choices in an illegitimate way. 
After a court decision on subsidies, the decree was redrawn, and in 2009 
the new decree EEC 1370/2007 became the legal reference. This decree 
allows the following procedures: First, the city administration can give 
competence to perform the LPT service to a public operator, although 
this option is supposedly exceptional. Second, it is possible to give compe-
tence to perform service to a private operator directly if the amount is lim-
ited (below 2 million euros or 600,000 passenger-kilometres2 maximum 
for small enterprises). The majority of services are expected to undergo a 
competitive tendering procedure, which is the third option.
National laws regulate the flow of subsidies; in Germany, the law on re-
gionalisation plays an important role. Although not originally meant for 
paying direct LPT subsidies, the money directed for regional cooperation 
in transportation can also be used for LPT operations. One reason may be 
that these subsidies replaced direct financial support for providing public 
transportation according to the law for financing LPT at the local lev-
el (Gemeindeverkehrsfinanzierungsgesetz, GVFG). In Finland, the law 
on public transportation called Joukkoliikennelaki (869/2009) applies the 
EU regulation to the national level. It was developed from the decree 
343/1991, which introduced competitive tendering to Finnish municipal-
ities.
2  pkm = passenger-kilometres - the distance that all users of public transportation 
travel in a year.
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3.  Quasi-Market Arrangements in LPT –  
Empirical Observations from Germany
In Germany, public operators have traditionally provided LPT, and larger 
cities own a company that runs LPT under a service obligation. Smaller 
cities either seek to collaborate with larger neighbouring cities, or large 
state-owned companies provide the service, such as Deutsche Bahn. 
With the update of the EU legislation in 1991, nothing changed in the 
system of public monopolies, despite an ongoing legal debate on whether 
the municipalities were allowed such practices under the EU law. Even-
tually, some significant changes occurred as a consequence of financial 
steering mechanisms. Some of the state subsidies for LPT were paid un-
der the condition that cities in the same region would collaborate in or-
ganising public transportation (both rail and bus) for their area. Soon, 
those task-related collaborative entities, called Zweckverbände, formed 
among municipalities across Germany to plan, organise and finance LPT 
jointly. The operating area is called Verkehrsverbund and can extend 100 
kilometres in diameter and reach across administrative Länder bounda-
ries (for example VRN and VBB). The goal of this reform was to produce 
coordinated services for LPT users and improve usability, for instance, 
through creating connections across municipal borders and simplifying 
ticket acceptance. 
Pressure by lobbyists and some scholars (Ewers, Ilgmann, 1999) to abol-
ish the public monopolies and replace them with competitive structures 
increased in the late 1990s and early 2000s. In anticipation of a new EU 
legislation demanding competitive tendering as the sole LPT model, the 
State of Hessen passed a law in 2005 (ÖPNVG) that compelled all mu-
nicipalities (except members of the VRN Verkehrsverbund) to offer their 
services for competition. Consequently, the city of Frankfurt, as a part 
of Hessen, introduced competitive tendering for bus services despite the 
incumbent public operator’s resistance. The city network was divided and 
tendered in five parts over the next few years (Rehn, Valussi, 2006). As of 
2014, all parts have been tendered at least once. The public operator sur-
vived as one of three big players in the city, the other two being the private 
global players Veolia and Arriva. The price the city paid for LPT services 
has been significantly reduced, which is why it is regarded as a success 
by the city administration. On the downside, the market dynamics are 
quite limited, with few competitors, so the city is concerned with keeping 
all of the operators in the market, otherwise the competition may wane. 
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The city expressed the significance of maintaining the public operator as 
a backup player and keeping the market competitive. Seidel (2015) the-
orizes that two market entry barriers are access to infrastructure and the 
workforce. Collaboration between bus operators, encouraged and partly 
enforced by the city administration, has helped overcome access difficul-
ties (ibid.). 
Introduction of competitive tendering into Frankfurt happened against 
the will of the incumbent operator and its employees. The management 
of the public monopolist saw transaction costs exceeding possible bene-
fits and felt protective toward employees. The employees feared losing 
their jobs, worsening working conditions and loss of benefits, all of which 
happened, except for layoffs. Both groups would reverse the reforms if 
possible (Seidel, Vakkuri, 2013b).
As of 2014, the Frankfurt example is still an exception to the rule of public 
monopolies in Germany (Beck, 2012). Except for the state of Hessen, 
competitive tendering occurs in the areas which have one dominant city 
in the region. This observation suggests that the collaborative entities, 
whose players are equal, tend to prefer a status quo. This makes sense, 
as many actors need to agree on a significant change such as the shift 
from direct contracts to competitive tendering. Because the coordination 
within the task unit requires substantial work, the actors hesitate to put 
such a controversial subject on the agenda unless outside pressure is ex-
ceptionally strong. In the areas where one large city dominates smaller 
ones, initiating a change appears easier. Another reason for the tendency 
of smaller towns to refrain from tendering may be the fear that lack of 
applications will lead to no competition, putting the present monopolist 
in an even stronger position. In addition, the entire cost of preparing for a 
new system would be wasted, and fear of the unknown, or risk avoidance, 
seems to have a role in maintaining the present system.
Many German cities have decided to continue to give services to their 
own operators for various reasons. The arguments in favour of continu-
ing public delivery are partly congruent with the arguments against com-
petitive tendering. In Wuppertal, for example, there is a presiding fear 
of transaction costs for changing the organisational model. The city has 
refrained from introducing competitive tendering structures because offi-
cials doubt that there would be any economic gains. Instead, the operator 
believes that most of the cost reductions and efficiency improvements 
have already been achieved. The fear of losing expertise in organising LPT 
emerges when another vendor provides the service. For now, Wuppertal’s 
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city administration is trying to maintain the organisational form, but the 
administration has been active in implementing some market-like struc-
tures. After releasing the bus operator from the public administration 
structure, the management received more independence in decision-mak-
ing. Under pressure to reduce costs, the public operator has subcontract-
ed lines, bought private operators and transferred employees to a separate 
service company. While the workers opposed these changes because they 
could lead to deterioration of income and working conditions, the man-
agement welcomed the reforms (Seidel, 2015). 
The private monopoly is a rather rare organisational form in Germany. 
According to the EU legislation, only small services can be given directly 
to a private operator without competition. Hence, this model works only 
for small cities or as a supplementary form of service provision in larger 
ones. There is an exception in case the entire network is sold to a private 
company in a competition. For example, Pforzheim was among the first 
German cities to sell the majority of their public company to a private 
operator, Veolia. However, this case is not a clear-cut monopoly because 
the city kept a minority share and the sale included a call option. Fear of 
the unknown, commercial exploitation and concerns regarding workers’ 
rights led to public protests, ending in a non-binding vote. The city decid-
ed to make the deal against the will of the majority of voters because it 
was in a desperate financial situation following the global economic crisis, 
which struck Pforzheim in particular. The liberal mayor saw an opportu-
nity to ease the city’s fiscal problems by selling assets and having private 
companies provide potentially cheaper public services. To address voters’ 
concerns, the city decided to keep a minority share and include a call 
option in the contract. Concerns about the loss of workers’ rights were 
addressed in the contract as well, with the city compensating individual 
income losses. The actors managed to find a solution for keeping exper-
tise in the city and transferring knowledge to the operator by appointing 
the former head of the transportation unit as the new manager of the joint 
venture (Schütze et al., 2009; Seidel, 2015).
Veolia’s calculations turned out to be too optimistic and the operator 
recorded losses for most years. To save costs, the management tried to 
make agreements with the labour unions that would negate the securities 
guaranteed in the working contracts, which the union partly accepted. 
The situation developed in such a dissatisfactory way that in 2014 the city 
decided to use the call option to end the contract and buy back the shares 
from Veolia. A serious dispute about the value of the shares has been 
ignited, as the city insists on the contract despite Veolia’s preference to 
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price in the losses from the previous year, claiming that the losses are en-
tirely to the disadvantage of the private partner. This latest development 
has dissuaded other cities from copying the Pforzheim model; especially 
since the city itself believes that the transaction costs more than keeping 
the previous structures (Seidel, 2015). 
4.  Quasi-Market Arrangements in LPT –  
Empirical Observations from Finland 
Finland’s LPT services are organized in a much more different manner 
than in Germany. Traditionally, most cities were served by private opera-
tors who enjoyed a de facto monopoly of repeatedly renewed concessions 
(Rosenberg, Räsänen, 2005). Finnish municipalities had little choice – they 
could either accept the private offer or provide the services themselves. 
Only the five largest cities in the country (in the capital region of Helsinki, 
Tampere and Turku) used city-owned companies to organise LPT. In the 
Helsinki region especially, numerous concession holders caused a cha-
otic situation of uncoordinated public and private services. To improve 
coordination in the capital region and break up the private monopolies 
with their excessive pricing, Helsinki, Espoo and Vantaa were allowed to 
change jointly their organisation type to a competitive tendering regime. 
First, the services outside Helsinki and across the municipal borders were 
tendered in 1994, and later transportation within Helsinki was included in 
the system. The coordination of public transport improved significantly. 
The competition is still active and the prices the authorities pay are much 
lower than before (Valkama, Flinkkilä, 2003; Sinisalo, 2007). The public 
operator from Helsinki is one of the seven players in the network today 
and is regarded as valuable for benchmarking. Unlike Frankfurt, the pub-
lic operator is not needed as a safeguard, but the operator helps to keep 
prices low through winning tenders (Seidel, Vakkuri, 2013b). Problems 
in Helsinki have occurred because of unhealthy competition, leading to 
an unprofitable market (Valkama, Flinkkilä, 2003). Deteriorating working 
conditions and low salaries have made the job market so unattractive that 
the companies have had difficulty recruiting workers (Haatainen, Haris-
alo, 2003). Despite these problems, the case is considered a success by 
the city administration and as a consequence, other cities have started 
following Helsinki’s example (Sinisalo, 2007).
First Turku and then Tampere introduced competitive tendering. While 
Turku is strict with their tenders, Tampere plans to keep 50 per cent of 
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tenders under public control through direct service contracts. The man-
ager of the public operator was successful in preventing competition for 
a long time, negotiating annual cost reductions with the city for a safe 
monopoly in return (Seidel, 2015). In 2006, though, there was a purchas-
er-provider split, which was applied to the city’s entire public sector, lead-
ing to greater cost transparency and laying the ground for additional or-
ganisational shifts (Kallio et al., 2006). Although the management is more 
independent on paper, the public operator still needs to fulfil obligations 
and tasks that the administration sets. The need to utilize employees from 
other parts of city administration and the compulsory use of city services 
means that the company is still not as autonomous as a private operator 
(Seidel, Vakkuri, 2013a). 
Despite the manager’s attempts to maintain the monopoly, in 2009 Tam-
pere introduced its first tendering process as a test when tendering advo-
cates gained control of the city administration. The city was satisfied with 
the results and decided to tender half of the city network gradually, some-
times excluding their own operator from competing. This system shift still 
occurred in 2014, and several private operators joined to manage LPT in 
Tampere. Currently, the city wants to keep the public operator as a back-
up and a benchmark for the future, especially since the operator has been 
successful in reducing costs. While the administration has been happy 
with the results so far, there is criticism of the changes from employees 
who have lost privileges and the public operator who sees advantages in 
the previous system (Seidel, 2015). 
Representing the majority of Finnish cities with a heritage of private mo-
nopolies, Jyväskylä’s LPT was operated by a private company (Jyväskylän 
Liikenne) for many decades. Despite paying high prices for the private 
service, the city administration did not consider establishing its own com-
pany as a viable option because of anticipated high transaction costs. The 
city lacked the infrastructure, personnel and expertise, and the admin-
istration did not want to jeopardize a successful, long-term relationship 
with the operator, despite paying excessive prices. Eventually, given the 
option of competitive tendering, the city finally decided to start competi-
tive tendering in 2014 – a decision that coincided with a personnel change 
(ibid.). 
Expecting cost reductions, as in Helsinki, the administration also spent 
time acquiring expertise in tendering processes and public transportation 
knowledge. In the tendering, naturally there were only private operators. 
The competition was won by a newcomer. However, the problem arose 
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with recruiting drivers and acquiring vehicles and infrastructure. The in-
cumbent immediately signalled the intent to keep those assets, which led 
to a dilemma for the new operator. The two operators engaged in a sub-
contract deal in which the incumbent operates all services the company 
used to operate. One may wonder how much real competition there is 
when the incumbent has such a strong position, preventing new entries 
by exploiting market entry barriers. Other mid-sized cities with former 
private monopolies such as Kuopio, Joensuu and Oulu have only recently 
begun competitive tendering (ibid.).
5. Conclusion
The aim of this paper has been to compare the organisational settings 
of LPT provision and to examine the factors contributing to institution-
al convergence and divergence when applying quasi-market elements. It 
deals with the use of market-oriented reforms in local government through 
an analysis of six case cities in Germany and Finland. 
Our study assesses the complex mechanisms and levels of institutional 
change in LPT provision. The question of convergence and divergence 
is dependent upon how we define the ultimate directions of institutional 
action. LPT systems in Germany and Finland are subject to common 
forces of normative isomorphism; EU-level regulation could theoretically 
lead to uniformity by introducing competitive tendering as an institution-
al norm. Observationally, though, the EU legislation has had only a mi-
nor impact while other institutional factors have played a more important 
role in shaping the institutional set-up of LPT. From the observation of 
German and Finnish cities using quasi-market elements in LPT, we find 
significant variance in the reforms’ impetus and their extent. We con-
clude that converging and diverging factors simultaneously shape LPT 
institutions.
Finnish cities are more in favour of competitive tendering than German 
cities. The main reason for this lies in trajectories. Due to tradition, pri-
vate monopolies in Finland have been regarded very critically and city 
officials were sure to save money through tendering. The example from 
Helsinki has been acclaimed as a success story, inspiring other cities to 
follow the same path, first Turku, then Tampere and others. Germany has 
lacked this success story, although Frankfurt possibly starts to take this 
position now. As frontrunners of LPT reforms in their respective coun-
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tries, Helsinki and Frankfurt fuel expectations that costs can be saved 
through competitive structures. Especially in fiscal emergencies, selling to 
the highest bidder seems to be a solution, as in Pforzheim. Nevertheless, 
public monopolies are generally regarded as less problematic by cities. 
German officials emphasized administrative public sector reforms (see 
Wuppertal) in order to improve efficiency and avoid transaction costs. 
In cities with lighter financial pressure, the public operator is threatened 
with competition (Tampere and Wuppertal). For public managers, this 
threat may provide a window of opportunity to push through institution-
al reforms they already consider necessary. Public companies adopt the 
management thinking and behaviour of business organisations by out-
sourcing and establishing companies, although the city, as the owner, may 
impose restrictions on these companies. The companies are compelled to 
employ certain groups of workers and use overpriced services and infra-
structure that contrast with their own business logic (Tampere, Pforzheim 
and Wuppertal).
For Germany, there are different influences of regional nature. Since the 
states have legislative power, they have imposed competitive tendering in 
the State of Hessen including Frankfurt. Further, the regional collabora-
tion between cities (Verkehrsverbund) plays a role and coordination tasks 
raise the barrier to initiate a change by one city only. Trade union power 
rhetoric stands against the willingness to give up privileges due to changes 
in organisation forms, since much of efficiency gains have been achieved 
in connection to workers. All changes have been accompanied by heavy 
resistance in both countries, but this concerns both public and private 
organisations. One of the side-effects is that excluding the opportunity of 
cutting personnel costs makes the involvement of new private companies, 
and thus competition, much less attractive.
A number of factors are arrayed against LPT market reforms. Avoidance 
of uncertainty and lack of expertise seem to prevent cities from adopting 
changes. Economic factors such as transaction costs and market entry 
barriers may prevent successful competition. Once started in the LPT sec-
tor, there is no guarantee that markets will function, and exploiting the 
monopoly position may stall change (cf. the development in Jyväskylä). 
Personal influence, as seen in Tampere and Jyväskylä, may delay the in-
troduction of a competitive structure for a long period, but reforms will be 
implemented once personal ties have diminished. Incumbent operators 
usually claim that they are more capable of providing the service than 
other providers, which may hinder market-oriented reforms. Other forc-
es that oppose market structures are the employees who rightfully fear 
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being worse off than before the reforms. Yet, they have little influence 
on preventing structural changes. Public opinion, in contrast, has proven 
successful in balancing at least some reforms in Pforzheim. 
Table 3 displays factors from the case cities that influence the institutional 
setup of LPT. The convergence factors are grouped according to the three 
causes of isomorphism, as described in Chapter 2: Normative, coercive 
and mimetic factors sometimes find counterparts in divergence, although 
some diverging factors cannot be neatly placed in these categories. The 
abbreviations in parentheses indicate to which city the factor applies or 
applied as a driving force.
Table 3: Empirical Factors Contributing to Convergence in the Use of 
Quasi-Market Structures in LPT Systems
Normative
•  EU regulation on competitive tendering as a standard in LPT (all 
cases)
•  Regional regulation (FRA)
Coercive
•  Belief in efficiency of competition (FRA, HEL, JYV, TMP) or 
other market elements (PFO, WUP) such as outsourcing, joint 
ventures and collaboration 
•  Suspicion of monopoly exploitation (JYV, HEL, TMP, PFO)
•  Fiscal emergency (HEL, PFO)
Mimetic
•  Following good practices (JYV, TMP)
Table 4: Factors Contributing to Divergence in the Use of Quasi-Market 
Structures in LPT Systems
•  Belief in superiority of a public agency (all public operators, espe-
cially in WUP, TMP) 
•  Other market failure elements, such as entry barriers (JYV, FRA), 
transaction costs (WUP, FRA), information asymmetry (PFO, 
JYV)
•  Lack of expertise (JYV) or the fear of losing it (PFO, WUP)
•  Use of market power preventing functioning markets (JYV)
•  Uncertainty caused by lack of knowledge and suitable examples 
(WUP, JYV)
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•  Personal relationships of key actors (TMP, JYV)
•  Large collaborative entities (WUP)
•  Special obligations for public companies (TMP, WUP, PFO)
•  Resistance to changing employees’ working conditions (PFO, 
HEL, TMP, FRA, WUP) 
Tables 3 and 4 present conclusions of the institutional analysis of the de-
cisive factors that shape quasi-market structures in LPT systems. Some of 
the diverging factors are being handled successfully. Market entry barriers 
have been reduced through forced collaboration and active competition 
policy in Frankfurt and Helsinki. Hybrid forms such as joint ventures have 
prevented monopoly exploitation in Pforzheim and outsourcing has re-
duced costs in Wuppertal, similar to shared markets in Tampere. 
The factors presented in Tables 3 and 4 often coexist in LPT systems; 
in addition, these factors apply to different levels of public administra-
tion and institutional life. In the context of LPT systems, convergence 
or divergence might be outcomes of EU-level regulation (see earlier), a 
national market-oriented zeitgeist (cf. Germany and Finland, including 
the case cities), local political and financial conditions (cf. Pforzheim and 
Helsinki) and individual actors, such as public managers (cf. Tampere 
and Jyväskylä). The research demonstrates a trend toward convergence 
(defined as “competitive structures” or “quasi-market arrangements”) in 
LPT systems, with an exceptionally rich complexity of institutional forms 
and their variants. More studies are required to explore this organisational 
complexity and the interaction of the shaping factors.
The field of administrative research is interested in the phenomenon of 
“re-municipalisation”, where previously privatised services are (again) 
being organised by public authorities. In this context, LPT in Finland 
cannot confirm the trend. There has been no case of shifting away from 
private operation in favour of public arrangements. There have been 
cases when private monopolies have been contested by tendering, with 
the result of private companies winning the competition and no public 
authority participating in the tendering, such as the case of Jyväskylä. 
The reason for this is a market entry barrier in the form of lack of exper-
tise in organising and operating LPT, as well as transaction costs. Since 
private monopolies have been the standard in Finland, market entry 
barriers prevent re-municipalisation at least for the time being. In cities 
where public provision exists, it does not gain overall market shares from 
private competitors.
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In Germany, the situation is different. There is expertise from the regu-
lar public operations dating back in time and the development towards 
privatisation has been delayed by decades, so that privatisation has not 
happened yet. Before “re-municipalisation” there obviously needs to be 
a privatisation phase, and the institutional failure can lead to a trend of 
reviving public operation. The experience of Pforzheim has the potential 
of becoming a showcase, where the city is ending collaboration with the 
private operator. Generally, it is too early to identify re-municipalisation 
in Germany’s LPT.
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INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE OF QUASI-MARKET  
ARRANGEMENTS IN LOCAL PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION –  
COMPARATIVE OBSERVATIONS FROM  
GERMANY AND FINLAND
Summary
The paper analyses the effects of implementation of quasi-market reforms on lo-
cal public transportation systems in Finland and Germany. Along with several 
other sectors of public service, local public transportation (LPT) has been subject 
to market-oriented reforms. In line with worldwide New Public Management 
reforms, quasi-market arrangements are presumed to produce more value for 
money for users and citizens. The aim of this paper is to analytically compare the 
organisational settings of LPT provision and delineate the factors that contribute 
to institutional convergence and divergence when applying quasi-market models. 
An extensive dataset of six case cities from Finland and Germany is used in 
order to analyse some of the most important trends and trajectories for different 
governmental levels (e.g., EU regulation), reflecting upon the empirical findings 
from the two countries. Utilizing an institutional theory approach, the relevant 
quasi-market arrangements in LPT are covered: public monopoly, private mo-
nopoly and competitive tendering. The study discusses different factors that con-
tribute to or hinder market-oriented structures in LPT and explores institutional 
theory-driven explanations as to why, for instance, Finland embraces market 
structures, whereas Germany shows more resistance to increased competition. 
Certain issues that seem quite similar irrespective of the two countries’ contexts 
are discussed as well.
Keywords: local public services, public transportation, markets, quasi-markets, 
Finland, Germany
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INSTITUCIONALNA PROMJENA KVAZI-TRŽIŠNIH  
ARANŽMANA U LOKALNOM JAVNOM PRIJEVOZU –  
KOMPARATIVNE OPSERVACIJE IZ  
NJEMAČKE I FINSKE 
Sažetak
U radu se analiziraju efekti primjene kvazi-tržišnih reformi na sustave lokalnog 
javnog prijevoza u Finskoj i Njemačkoj. Lokalni javni prijevoz je s nekoliko 
drugih sektora javnih službi podvrgnut kvazi-tržišnim reformama. Prema ideji 
svjetski raširenih reformi u okviru novog javnog menadžmenta, smatra se da 
će kvazi-tržišni aranžmani dovesti do adekvatne »vrijednosti za novac« za 
korisnike i građane. Cilj rada je analitički usporediti organizacijsko uređen-
je lokalnog javnog prijevoza i utvrditi faktore koji pridonose institucionalnom 
približavanju i udaljavanju kad se primjenjuju kvazi-tržišni modeli. Koriste se 
bogate baze podataka za šest gradova u Finskoj i Njemačkoj da bi se ana-
lizirali neki od najvažnijih trendova i razvojnih linija za različite razine vlasti 
(primjerice, EU regulacija) te se donose zaključci temeljem empirijskih nalaza 
iz dvije navedene zemlje. Koristeći pristup institucionalne teorije, analiziraju 
se relevantni kvazi-tržišni aranžmani u lokalnom javnom prijevozu: monopol 
javnog sektora, monopol privatnog sektora i natjecateljsko prikupljanje ponuda. 
Rad raspravlja o različitim faktorima koji pospješuju ili otežavaju djelovanje 
tržišno orijentiranih struktura u lokalnom javnom prijevozu te ispituje na in-
stitucionalnoj teoriji utemeljena tumačenja zašto je, primjerice, Finska prigrlila 
tržišne strukture dok Njemačka pokazuje više otpora razvijanju kompeticije. 
Raspravlja se i o pitanjima kod kojih postoji sličnost neovisno o kontekstu dviju 
zemalja. 
Ključne riječi: lokalne javne službe, javni prijevoz, tržišta, kvazi-tržišta, Fin-
ska, Njemačka 
